W e investigate the formal relationship between separability of processes and the types of non-interference properties they enjoy. Though intuitively appealing, separability -the ability to define a process as a parallel composition of disjoint components -alone cannot adequately prove the absence of information pow. W e present a number of laws for the composition oj'secure systems, and an example to show how such laws can be applied.
Introduction
Separability is an idea which has origin in the design of secure operating systems [9] . Informally, a system is separable if its users (or user processes) can be isolated from each other. The purpose of this isolatioln is to achieve mutual non-interference between users.
The separability condition has been formalisled elsewhere (e.g. [2, 5] ), and we adopt the definition that a process is separable if equivalent to a parallel composition of sub-processes with disjoint alphabets. This condition is succinctly expressed in the process algebraic notation of CSP [4] which we will employ in the following. We formally relate separability to a number of non-interference conditions including "lazy noninterference" of [8] . An interesting by-result of this is that separability alone should generally not be regarded as proving the absence of information flow, as long as there is the possibility of non-determinism. We present laws which preserve security under parallel composition, even in the presence of non-deternninism.
In the following section we summarise two related but subtly different types of non-interference, which we call independence and invariance, respectively. These will be related to the separability Condition in Section 3. The subsequent section shows how to compose secure parts to yield a secure whole; the power of this idea is illustrated in Section 5. The final section presents our conclusions.
Notions of Non-interference
The notation employed in the rest of this plaper is summarised in the Appendix. We describe processes within the context of the failures-divergences model of CSP, although unless specifically allowed otherwise we assume all processes are free of divergence. Given a process P whose alphabet can be partitioned into sets A and El, we reserve the notation for the process RUNA //I P ; a typical trace of this prolcess is a trace of P with arbitrary events from A inserted. The "C" is with reference to the '(lazy" abstra.ction by interleaving of [8] . We do not, address "eager" abstraction (by hiding) here since it, supposes that abstracted events happen instantaneously, which the lazy form does not. Lazy abstraction thus t,akes a more standard view of how actions are modelled, and appears likely to be more relevant in practice. A detailed motivation for the definition and its uses in the specification of non-interference properties can be fouind in [8, 71. Definition 2.1 Let P be a process and { A , B } be a partition of a P . Then B is said to be independent (of A ) .in P , written LINDB(P), if and only if the process LBi(P) is deterministic.'
A number of weaker definitions of non-interference have been proposed. Not all of these involve an explicit process abstraction, but typically they demand that two processes, after some activity in one part of the alphabet, are equivalent modulo lazy abst,raction. All conditions stated in the following definition are equivalent, and we refer to them with the generic term "invariance" . Theorem 2.2 Let { A , B } be a partition of the alpha,bet of process P . The following statements are equivalent.
The notation used in this paper is different from that in our previous paper [SI since our developing understanding of the variety and relationships of different security properties has required a revised and more systematic nomenclature. Irr the earlier paper the condition CINDB(P) was written L-SECA(P).
b's, t E TRACES(P)
Definition 3.2 Process P is said to be strongly separable with respect to partition { A , B } if and only if there exist deterministic processes PA and PB with (YPA = A and (YPB = B such that
Let us start to investigate the relationship between separability and the non-interference conditions of the previous section. It is tempting to conjecture (and indeed the authors did) that seDarabihtv is eauivalent,
REFS(P/S) n P B = to mutual invariance, i.e. that a process P can be split as PA [[SI1 Pg precisely if both CINVB(P) and LINVA (P) hold. For many processes this will indeed be the case.
On closer inspection, however, this conjecture turns out to be untrue. The simplest counterexample is given by
where the notation IIDB denotes the power set of B .
Condition (2.) is the failures-divergence invariance discussed in [7] . Condition (4.) is a straightforward extension of Allen's [l] that also takes refusal behaviour into account rather than initials only. 
Lemma 2.4
Given that { A , B } partitions the alphabet of process P, then conditions above is satisfie 3 .
LINDB(P) + CINVB(P).
Theorem 2.5
Given that { A , B } partitions the alphabet of process P , and P is deterministic, then CINDB(P) @ CINVB(P).
Proof Can be found in [7] .
3 Characterising Separability
Separability as a security criterion has intuit,ive appeal. Processes with disjoint alphabets do not, synchronise on events when combined in parallel; there is thus no scope for direct interference between them. We adopt the following standard definition of a process that can be separated into two component,s. An important strengthening of this condition is the requirement for the component processes to be deterministic. This case is referred to as strong separability.
After any trace of P, event a may be accepted or refused, irrespective of any b events occurring, and the same is true for the reverse. Therefore both { U } and { b } are invariant in P . The process, however, is not separable. In particular, P is not equivalent, to
since P' may refuse the set { u , b } which P cannot. This means a user with interface {Q} who sees this event refused can deduce that the other event b is not refused; this is a flow of information we probably want to prohibit. This example demonstrates that, (i) it is essential to consider refusals in addition to traces when analysing information flows, and (ii) the flows resulting from refusals can be more subtle than anticipated.
In order to establish an equivalence between separability and mutual invariance, it is necessary to strengthen the definition of invariance. This can be achieved by considering the behaviour of the process, not after a particular trace s is observed, but after a particular failure (s, X ) is observed. We therefore redefine the standard 'after' operator to include refusal information as follows.
Definition 3.3 Let P / ( s , X ) (for ( s , X ) E FAILS(P)
and s DIVS(P)) be defined
Equipped with this operator, Definition 2.3 is strengthened as follows. Strong invariance lies half-way between invariance and independence, and consequently (Theorems 2.5 and 3.5) these three conditions are equivalent for deterministic processes. Theorem 3.5 Let A and B partition a P . Then LINDB(P) + LSINVB(P) + LINVB(P).
We can now turn attention to the main theorem of this section. 
The first line here is a simple property of 'after', the second because the alphabets of Q and R are disjoint, the next two both because RUNB is a zero of I I I for divergence-free processes with alphabet 13, and the last one by definition.
The "if" proof requires us to show that if both invariance properties hold then we can separate P . In fact, we will show that
P = (PI[BIlSTOP) I[~ll(PI[AlIS~OP).
Call the left-and right-hand processes in the above parallel PA and PB respectively. The main part of the proof is contained in the following lemma: 
This completes the proof that ( P l s ) " = and it follows that a E (Pis)' as required. cl Suppose that process P is separable and tJhat all its components are deterministic. Since a parallel composition of deterministic processes is always deterministic 141, P itself will be deterministic. From Theorems 2.5 and 3.6 we therefore obtain: 
Secure Composition
The previous section has shown the close link between separability of a process into disjoint components and security conditions. Separability when provable, is evidence of the lack of information flow. However we should point out that separability is, surprisingly, not sufficient evidence to exclude information flow. For while clearly any process that is actually constructed as the disjoint parallel composition of two processes will be secure no matter what, the internal structure of the processes, mere semantic equivalence to such a system (which is what separability states) turns out not to be good enough. The reason is that the resolution of nondeterminism within the system may create insecurities. This is discussed at length in [7] . Here, we merely give a simple example.
is the most nondeterministic divergence-free process with alphabet A U B. And it is separable (it equals CHAOSA I[ 0 1 1 CHAOSB). Constructed as above we would have few doubts as to the security of this process, but unfortunately it is semantically equal to the process CHAOSAUB n P for any divergence-free P at all, however insecure. A process like this, with an internal mechanism that allows it to behave securely or insecurely (perhaps being certain to choose the latter because of considerations below the level of modelling) should not be regarded as secure. But it is still separable. It is only strong separability that should be regarded as establishing the absence of information flow (though noting it still ignores timing issues).
From a more practical point of view, however, separability of processes is far from a universal security condition. The main reason for this is that noninterference is generally regarded as an asymmetric property in the sense that if A must not interfere with B , we need not always exclude the reverse. Fortunately, Corollary 3.8 shows how we can "skew" the condition of separability to give an asymmetric property: we might want to demand LINDB(P) but do not necessarily require A to be independent, as well.
Secondly, even if the final result of a development is separable, it is highly unlikely that the actual system is built as the disjoint parallel composition of two processes. (If it were, there would not, be much need of a detailed formal analysis!) If we are tjo seek rules which allow us to build up secure systems, we will need ones that allow us to deal with cases of composing processes whose alphabets do intersect.
What is required is a development method that allows functional designs and verification of their security properties. Such a method would permit the definition of components, not necessarily with disjoint alphabets, and their composition to yield systems secure as a whole. T h e compositional laws we present below show under which conditions we can combine subsystems such that their composition is guaranteed to be secure. We concentrate here on the determinismbased independence properties, since we believe they give the most satisfactory definition of absence of information flow.
The context of the following two laws is a system in which events A are required not to interfere with events B . They simply allow us to add a process at one end of a secure system without violating security. The final law states that we safely combine two secure components, confident in the knowledge that the result will be secure as well. 
ti r B = t z IB A t l " ( h ) E T R A C E S (~) A ( t z , { b } ) E FAILS(~).
If RUNA 111 fP I[ (YP n aQ]1 Q) were non-deterministic (but free of ivergence), we would therefore know that, there must be traces tl , t z and an event b 6 B such that
ti r B = t e [ B A t l^( b ) E TRACES(P I[ c~P n ( Y Q ]~ Q) A ( t 2 , { b } ) E F A I L S ( P I [~P~~Q ] I Q ) .
We distinguish two cases: either b is in both a1phabet)s of P and Q , or b is only in one of the alphabets of the processes, in which case we assume wlog b E a P .
Case b E a P -aQ. Since P does not need Q's cooperation for b we know it must be possible for P to refuse this event after t z . Also, it is P that contributes b after tl , and so we conclude
by the properties of parallel composition, which contradicts the assumption of LINDB(P).
Case b E a P n aQ. The refusal of b after t 2 may have been caused by either P or Q ; we assume wlog that P refuses the event after t 2 . Since both processes have to synchronise for b to occur after t l , we must, come to precisely the same conclusion as in the first, case.
In either case we derive a contradiction with the 0 assumptions, and so the theorem holds.
Example
The following example specification is intended to illustrate how the ideas described in the previous section allow the functional design of a system that is secure by construction.
Informal Requirements
A system is required in which four users are to share access to common resources. These resources are binary variables on which the following operations can be carried out: 
2.
Variable Y can be read by A and B when Z is set, toggled by B and D any time, and set only by B .
3.
Variable Z can be read by any user any time, but toggled only by D .
The security requirements we need to take inko account are:
and variable is unset (value 0).
A must not interfere with any other user.
Neither B nor C must interfere with D , and B and C must not interfere with each other.
D may interfere with any user.
Design
Using USER to denote the set, { A , B , C, Cb} and B I T to denote the range of the binary variables, we specify the access operations as
The alphabets of the processes implementing the variables are given by
It is straightforward to implement the desired fiinctionality with a single process for each variable.
Let us compose the system in two steps
and check at the same time whether the compo'sitions preserve our security requirements. This can be done by applying the compositional law described i n Theorem 4.3 four times, for each step. Before doing this, we need to define the alphabets of the users of the system. Verifying these will guarantee CINDuser~(SYSTEM) A CINDuserBD(SYSTEM) A CIND,sercD(SYSTEM) A CINDuserBcD (SYSTEM) and thus the security in the overall system. Of course, we can check these conditions directly, but this will yield the expected result.
We point out that all conditions above can be verified using the CSP model checker FDR'. This tool allows direct verification of whether a process is deterministic. The algorithm employed to verify determinism is described in [7] , and a further example of the use of FDR in security modelling can be found in [8].
An Alternative Design
Let us now enhance the functionality of the system. Variables Y and Z should remain unchanged, while X should additionally allow user B to set its value. With Our system implementation has to be modified in one process:
The complete system is composed in the same two steps as described in the initial design, and the proof obligations are precisely the same. For the first step, all conditions do indeed hold (since we have not changed VARY or VARZ), which again establishes that VARY2 is secure. The final composition, however, does not preserve security. It is not possible to meet any of the obligations for the second step. This is the case because 'FDR (Failures-Divergence Refinement) is a product of Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd., 3 Alfred St., Oxford OX1 3EH, UK. user B may find the event setX .B refused after either A or C has toggled X , and t,hus either can int,erfere with B.
The security breach is caught by our conditions as follows. For condition (2.) for instance, we require the process RUNuserAc 111 VARX (0) to be deterministic. It is not, however, since after (for example) trace (toggleX .A) the event setX .B may be accepted or refused in a non-deterministic fashion. Thus neither C I N D u s e r~~( VARX(0)) nor C I N D u S e r~~ (SYSTEM) holds, the latter because process RUNuserAC 111 SYSTEkl may accept or refuse setX.B after (e.g.) trace
We note that none of the other pre-conditions for the composition holds, since the processes
are non-deterministic for the same reasons
Conclusions
We have seen both how security properties can be used to decompose processes, and how security properties are preserved under parallel composition.
It is satisfying to see that the historically important property of separability can be characterised using our abstraction mechanisms, but the reader should also note the limitations we pointed out, on the soundness of separability as a security specification. Only in the context of deterministic systems do independence and invariance collapse down to the same predicate and thus either condition (or separability) may be used to prove lack of information-flow .
Since the determinism-based independence conditions are the most satisfactory definitions of absence of flow, we have concentrated on their compositional properties, though similar studies (and doubtless similar results) could be obtained for others. We have shown a number of laws which preserve event, independence under parallel composition. These compositional properties have a two-fold relevance in computer security. Firstly, they allow to place emphasis -if so desired -on the functional properties of system components without sacrificing security concerns. Secondly, they provide the key to formal or automatic verification since the security of the whole system follows from that of its parts.
It is worth noting that, as discussed in 81 and [7] , isting model-checking technology. The examples presented in the previous section have all been verified (or shown insecure) using the tool FDR., which has the capability of handling much larger examples than this one. Of course the existence of composition laws like ours should extend the range of systems which come within the reach of tools like FDR.. conditions based on determinism map we I 1 onto ex- 
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